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Geographic distribution of mining

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Bitcoin mining's geographic distribution has shifted dramatically since 2021, when China's May 2021 mining ban produced the largest single migration of industrial mining capacity in the network's history. As of 2026, the principal jurisdictions are: the United States (~35-40% of network hashrate, concentrated in Texas, Georgia, Kentucky, and New York); Russia (~10-15%, concentrated in Siberian and Irkutsk hydroelectric regions); Kazakhstan (~8-10%, declining from ~15% in 2022 under fossil-fuel regulatory pressure); plus emerging concentrations in Paraguay, Bhutan, Ethiopia, and El Salvador via sovereign and quasi-sovereign programs. The structural drivers are electricity cost (dominant), energy mix (renewables increasingly favored under ESG pressure), regulatory environment, and post-China-ban geopolitical diversification. Geographic-distribution data is most reliably tracked through CCAF's quarterly reports and Hashrate Index's facility-level data.

Why this note matters

Geographic distribution is a load-bearing measure of mining decentralization. A geographically concentrated mining industry creates systemic vulnerabilities (regulatory-shutdown risk in any single jurisdiction; geopolitical-conflict exposure; coordinated-attack vulnerability). The post-2021 trajectory has been one of meaningful geographic diversification away from the prior China-concentrated state, though concentration risks remain in specific patterns (US-state concentration; foundry-supply-chain concentration in Taiwan; pool-operator concentration distinct from facility distribution).

This section treats the empirical-geographic landscape; the geopolitical-policy dimension is in Geopolitics of mining; substantive analytical critique of geographic concentration is in Mining centralization concerns (Criticisms).

The pre-2021 China-concentrated landscape

Prior to May 2021, China hosted approximately 65-75% of global Bitcoin mining hashrate. The concentration drivers were:

  • Sichuan hydroelectric. Massive seasonal hydroelectric capacity (especially during rainy season) with surplus that had no other buyer at competitive prices.
  • Inner Mongolia coal. Cheap coal-fired electricity in a region with substantial industrial-power surplus.
  • Xinjiang coal and wind. Similar dynamics in western China.
  • ASIC manufacturer proximity. Bitmain and MicroBT are headquartered in China; logistical proximity to manufacturers reduced acquisition friction for Chinese operators.
  • Regulatory tolerance. Pre-2021 Chinese regulatory framework was tolerant of mining (the 2017 ICO ban and broader crypto-trading restrictions did not explicitly target mining).

The 2021 inflection. Beginning in May 2021, Chinese provincial governments and then central government announced explicit mining bans. The reasoning combined environmental concerns (especially coal-fired mining in Inner Mongolia), capital-controls concerns, and broader crypto-policy alignment.

The migration. Between May 2021 and December 2021, Chinese mining hashrate fell from ~65% of network total to near zero. Mining hardware physically migrated to other jurisdictions (Kazakhstan was the principal initial destination); some operators sold ASIC inventory to non-Chinese operators rather than physically relocating.

The post-2021 distribution

As of 2026, the geographic distribution has stabilized into a multi-jurisdictional pattern:

United States (~35-40% of network hashrate). The largest single jurisdiction by hashrate.

  • Texas is the principal US state, with substantial concentration in the Rockdale area, Corsicana, Permian basin (flare-gas mining), and West Texas regions with substantial wind capacity. The ERCOT-isolated grid and the state’s mining-friendly regulatory framework have made Texas the dominant US mining state.
  • Georgia, Kentucky, New York, and several other states host substantial mining operations. Each state’s regulatory environment shapes its mining-industry trajectory: Texas friendly, New York more restrictive (after a 2022 mining-moratorium law).
  • Washington State, Oregon, Wyoming, and others host smaller but specific mining-industry presences typically focused on hydroelectric or stranded-energy.
  • The US Strategic Bitcoin Reserve debate (post-2024) has changed the federal-level engagement; specific federal policy on mining remains evolving.

Russia (~10-15%). Substantial concentration in Siberia and the Irkutsk region, with cheap hydroelectric power and continental-climate cooling advantages. Russian mining has grown despite Western sanctions complicating capital flows and equipment imports; the sanctioned-jurisdiction profile creates compliance complications for international hosting and pool participation.

Kazakhstan (~8-10%). Initially the principal destination for post-China-ban migration, peaking at ~15% of network hashrate in 2022. Subsequent regulatory pressure (electricity-rate restrictions, surtaxes on mining electricity, periodic regulatory tightening) has reduced Kazakhstan’s share. The fossil-fuel-heavy electricity mix has made Kazakhstan’s mining the principal contributor to network-level fossil-fuel-share concerns.

Canada (~5-7%). Substantial concentration in Quebec (hydroelectric) and British Columbia (hydroelectric); some Alberta (mixed grid). Iris Energy and Hut 8 are principal participants.

Smaller and emerging jurisdictions:

  • Paraguay (~2-4%). Itaipu Dam (world’s largest hydroelectric facility by certain measures) provides essentially unlimited cheap electricity; sovereign mining program developing.
  • Bhutan. Sovereign Bitcoin mining program via Druk Holding & Investments; hydroelectric-based; engaged in Geopolitics of mining.
  • El Salvador. Geothermal-based sovereign Bitcoin mining program; volcanic-energy framing.
  • Ethiopia. Substantial hydroelectric capacity; emerging mining presence.
  • Argentina, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE. Various smaller-scale operations.

Western Europe. Limited mining presence due to high electricity costs; specific operators (Northern Europe; some Iceland and Norway operations) but small in total share.

The principal location-determining factors

Electricity cost (dominant factor). Cost-of-power is the principal driver. Industrial-mining-grade electricity at <$0.05/kWh is the threshold for profitable mining; jurisdictions offering this attract mining capacity.

Energy mix. Increasingly important as institutional miners face ESG pressure. Renewable-rich jurisdictions (Norway, Quebec, Paraguay, Iceland, parts of Texas with high wind/solar) are increasingly preferred.

Regulatory environment. Jurisdictions with stable energy policies, mining-friendly tax treatment, and predictable regulatory frameworks grow; jurisdictions with unstable policy (Kazakhstan’s electricity surtaxes; Iran’s intermittent enforcement) decline.

Cooling and climate. Cold-climate jurisdictions (Siberia, Northern Canada, Iceland) have natural cooling advantages reducing operational overhead. Hot-climate jurisdictions (Texas, Middle East) require more substantial cooling infrastructure.

Geographic and political risk. Operators increasingly diversify across jurisdictions to manage regulatory-shutdown risk in any single location. The 2021 China experience emphasized this lesson.

Hardware and operations logistics. Proximity to ports (for hardware imports), reliable internet connectivity, and labor availability shape facility-siting decisions.

US-state-level dynamics

The US accounts for the largest single share of mining; US-state-level dynamics are particularly important:

Texas. The dominant US state. ERCOT-isolated grid creates unique market dynamics — substantial wind capacity creates intermittent-generation surplus that mining absorbs; demand-response markets reward mining flexibility; Texas’s politically-mining-friendly stance (state-level laws specifically supporting mining as a controllable-load resource) reinforce the concentration.

Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina. Mid-Atlantic and Southeast US states with cheap-power-and-cooling profiles plus moderately-mining-friendly regulatory environments.

Washington State, Oregon. Hydroelectric-rich Pacific Northwest; mining has been controversial in some local jurisdictions (especially central Washington’s smaller hydroelectric districts) but persists in others.

Wyoming. Strong mining-friendly regulatory environment (Caitlin Long’s banking infrastructure work); some flare-gas mining in the Powder River basin.

New York. State-level mining moratorium (2022) created a partial-shutdown for new mining facilities; existing facilities continued operations with various compliance requirements.

California, New England states. Limited mining presence due to high electricity costs and regulatory environments.

The federal-state policy tension. US federal mining policy is evolving; state-level policies vary substantially. The Trump-era US Strategic Bitcoin Reserve debate (post-2024) has shifted the federal engagement but state-level policies remain the dominant operational factor.

Concentration-and-diversification metrics

The post-2021 trajectory has been one of diversification, but specific concentration patterns persist:

Single-jurisdiction concentration. No single jurisdiction now exceeds ~40% of network hashrate (US is the largest at ~35-40%). This is substantially better than the pre-2021 ~65-75% China concentration.

Top-3 jurisdiction concentration. US + Russia + Kazakhstan together account for ~55-65% of hashrate. Substantial but not as concentrated as the pre-2021 single-jurisdiction state.

Facility-level concentration. A small number of large facilities (Marathon’s Garden City Texas facility; Riot’s Rockdale; Foundry-affiliated facilities; major Russian Siberian facilities) account for substantial individual fractions of hashrate. Multi-100-MW facilities are typical at the high end.

Power-availability concentration. Mining inevitably concentrates wherever cheap power is available. This produces structural concentration around specific power sources (Texas wind/gas; Siberian hydro; Kazakhstan coal; Paraguay hydro; etc.).

The diversification trajectory. Adding more jurisdictions to the mining-active set has been a slow but structural trend. Each major emerging jurisdiction (Paraguay, Bhutan, Ethiopia, El Salvador, Oman) adds a few percentage points of diversification.

Tradeoffs and design choices

Geographic concentration as efficiency-vs-decentralization tradeoff. Cheap-power-locations attract mining; this produces structural concentration. Alternative distributions (forced geographic spreading; subsidies for distributed mining) would reduce efficiency. The current market-driven distribution is efficient but produces concentration concerns.

ESG-driven geographic preferences vs cost-driven preferences. Increasingly, public miners and institutional operators face pressure to operate in renewable-rich jurisdictions. This creates preference for some jurisdictions over others on grounds beyond cost; the long-run trajectory favors renewable-rich operations.

Sovereign-mining concentration vs broad-based distribution. Sovereign programs (Bhutan, El Salvador, Paraguay, potentially US Strategic Reserve) introduce concentration at the sovereign-actor level. The dynamics differ from private-operator concentration; the substantive engagement is in Geopolitics of mining.

Hashrate-mobility-as-feature vs hashrate-mobility-as-bug. The 2021 China migration demonstrated that mining can relocate within months. This is a feature (resistance to regulatory shutdown in any single jurisdiction) and a bug (operators can flee compliance environments to less-strict ones). The right framing depends on the regulatory question.

Substantive analytical critique of geographic concentration including the specific concerns about US-and-China-concentration vectors lives in Mining centralization concerns; the sovereign-mining geopolitics is engaged in Geopolitics of mining and Strategic Bitcoin Reserve political debates.

Open questions for further development

  • Will the post-2021 diversification trajectory continue, or stabilize at current levels? Each subsequent diversification step is harder than the previous.
  • How does the US Strategic Bitcoin Reserve debate affect US-domestic-mining policy? The federal engagement is evolving; specific policy on domestic mining could shift either direction.
  • What is the realistic trajectory for sovereign-mining programs? Bhutan, El Salvador, Paraguay, and others may scale up; new sovereigns may enter; specific programs may fail.
  • How does AI-infrastructure-pivot affect geographic distribution? Public miners pivoting to AI may concentrate in different jurisdictions than Bitcoin-mining-pure operations; the dynamics are evolving.
  • What is the geopolitical-disruption-scenario sensitivity? A US-China conflict, a major regulatory shift in a top-3 jurisdiction, or other major disruptions would test the geographic mobility of the industry.

Canonical sources for this note

  • Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance (CCAF) — quarterly Bitcoin Mining Map and geographic-distribution data
  • Hashrate Index (Luxor Technology) — facility-level data and mining-industry analytics
  • Daniel Batten / bitcoinminingmap.com — facility-level mining visualization
  • Public-miner facility disclosures (10-K, 10-Q filings) — most-detailed facility-level data
  • Industry coverage via The Block, CoinDesk Mining Week, Compass Mining, BraiinsOS+

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